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Abstract
What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents?
The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, where
many evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator dynamics, are known to converge to sets of
equilibria. Even in such classic settings many questions remain unanswered. We examine
issues such as:
• Point-wise convergence: Does the system always equilibrate, even in the presence of
continuums of equilibria?
• Computing regions of attraction: Given point-wise convergence can we compute the
region of asymptotic stability of each equilibrium (e.g., estimate its volume, geometry)?
• System invariants: Invariant functions remain constant along every system trajectory.
This notion is orthogonal to the game theoretic concept of a potential function, which
always strictly increases/decreases along system trajectories. Do dynamics in potential
games exhibit invariant functions? If so, how many? How do these functions look like?
Based on these geometric characterizations, we propose a novel quantitative framework
for analyzing the efficiency of potential games with many equilibria. The predictions of
different equilibria are weighted by their probability to arise under evolutionary dynamics
given uniformly random initial conditions. This average case analysis is shown to offer novel
insights in classic game theoretic challenges, including quantifying the risk dominance in stag-
hunt games and allowing for more nuanced performance analysis in networked coordination
and congestion games with large gaps between price of stability and price of anarchy.
1 Introduction
The study of game dynamics is a basic staple of game theory with several books dedicated
exclusively to it [14, 12, 37, 6, 34]. Historically, the golden standard for classifying the behavior
of learning dynamics in games has been to establish convergence to equilibria. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that a significant part of the work on learning in games focuses on potential games
(and slight generalizations thereof) where many dynamics (e.g., replicator, smooth fictitious play)
are known to converge to equilibrium sets. The structure of the convergence proofs is essentially
universal across different learning dynamics and boils down to identifying a Lyapunov/potential
function that strictly decreases along any nontrivial trajectory. In potential games, as their name
suggests, this function is part of the description of the game and precisely guides self-interested
dynamics towards critical points of these functions that correspond to equilibria of the learning
process.
Potential games are also isomorphic to congestion games [24]. Congestion games have been
instrumental in the study of efficiency issues in games. They are amongst the most extensively
studied class of games from the perspective of price of anarchy and price of stability with many
tight characterization results for different subclasses of games (e.g., linear congestion games [33],
symmetric load balancing [26] and references therein).
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
38
85
v6
  [
cs
.G
T]
  2
 O
ct 
20
16
Given this extensive treatment of such a classic class of games it would seem, at a first glance,
that our understanding of these systems is more or less complete. We show that this is far from
the case. We focus on simple systems where replicator dynamic, arguably one of the most well
studied game dynamics, is applied to linear congestion games and (network) coordination games.
We resolve a number of basic open questions in the following results:
A) Point-wise convergence to equilibrium: In the case of linear congestion games and
(network) coordination games we prove convergence to equilibrium instead of equilibrium sets.
Convergence to equilibrium sets implies that the distance of system trajectories from the sets
of equilibria converges to zero. On the other hand, convergence to equilibrium, also referred to
as point-wise convergence, implies that every system trajectory has a unique limit point, which
is an equilibrium. In games with continuums of equilibria, (e.g., N balls N bins games1 with
N ≥ 4), the first statement is more inclusive that the second. In fact, system equilibration is not
implied by set-wise convergence, and the limit set of a trajectory may have complex topology
(e.g., the limit of social welfare may not be well defined). Despite numerous positive convergence
results in classes of congestion games ([11, 4, 10, 3, 1]), this is the first to our knowledge result
about deterministic point-wise convergence for any concurrent dynamic. This argument is based
on combining global Lyapunov functions arguments with local information theoretic Lyapunov
functions around each equilibrium.
B) Global stability analysis: Although the point-wise convergence result is interesting in
itself, it critically enables all other results in the paper. Specifically, we establish that modulo
point-wise convergence, all but a zero measure set of initial conditions converge to equilibrium
points which are (linearly) stable (i.e., their Jacobian has no eigenvalue with positive real part).
This is a technical result that combines game theoretic arguments with tools from dynamical
systems (Center-Stable Manifold theorem) and analysis (Lindelőf’s lemma). [17] has established
that all such equilibria must satisfy a refined game theoretic property and known as weakly
stability. A Nash equilibrium is weakly stable if given any two randomizing agents, fixing one of
the agents to choosing one of his strategies with probability one, leaves the other agent indifferent
between the strategies in his support. This condition is easy to work with (does not require
computing eigenvalues) and sometimes (along with the global stability result) already suffices to
make a unique prediction about the resulting system performance.
C) Invariant functions: Sometimes a game may have multiple (weakly) stable equilibria.
In this case we would like to be able to predict which one will arise given a specific (or maybe a
randomly chosen) initial condition. Systems invariants allows us to do exactly that. A system
invariant is a function defined over the system state space such that it remains constant along
every system trajectory. Establishing invariant properties of replicator dynamics in generalized
zero-sum games has helped prove interesting topological properties of the system trajectories
such as (near) cycles [31, 32, 29]. In the case of bipartite coordination games with fully mixed
Nash equilibria, we can establish similar invariant functions. Specifically, the difference between
the sum of the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergences of the evolving mixed strategies of the agents
on the left partition from their fully mixed Nash equilibrium strategy and the respective term for
the agents in the right partition remains constant along any trajectory. In the special case of
star graphs, we show how to produce n such invariants where n is the degree of the star. This
allows for creating efficient oracles for predicting to which Nash equilibrium the system converges
provably for any initial condition without simulating explicitly the system trajectory.
Applications: The tools that we have developed allow for novel insights in classic and well
studied class of games. We group our results into two clusters, average case performance analysis
and estimating risk dominance/regions of attraction.
Average Case Performance: We propose a novel quantitative framework for analyzing the
efficiency of potential games with many equilibria. Informally, we define the expected system
1These are symmetric load balancing games with n agents and n machines where the cost function of each
machine is the identity function.
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performance as the weighted average of the social costs of all equilibria where the weight of each
equilibrium is proportional to the volume (or more generally measure) of its region of attraction.
The main idea is as follows: The agents start participating in the game having some prior
beliefs about which are the best actions for them. We will typically assume that the initial beliefs
are chosen according to a uniform prior given that we want to assume no knowledge about the
agents’ internal beliefs2. Given this initial condition the agents start interacting through the
game and update their beliefs (i.e., their randomized strategies) up until they reach equilibrium.
At this point the measure of the region of attraction of an equilibrium captures exactly the
likelihood that we will converge to that state. So the average case performance computes, as
its names suggests, what will be the resulting system performance on average. As is typical in
algorithmic game theory, we can normalize this quantity by dividing with the performance of the
optimal state. We define this ratio as the average price of anarchy. In our convergent systems it
always lies between the price of stability and the price of anarchy. We analyze the average price
of anarchy in a number of settings which include, N balls N bins games, symmetric linear load
balancing games (with agents of equal weights)3, parametric versions of coordination games as
well as star network extensions of them. These are games with large gaps between the price of
stability and price of anarchy and replicator is shown to be able to zero in on the good equilibria
with high enough probability so that the average price of anarchy is always a small constant.
This measure of performance could help explain why some games are easy in practice, despite
having large price of anarchy. We aggregate these results below:
Average PoA Techniques PoS Pure PoA PoA
N balls N bins game 1 A & B 1 1 Θ(log n/ log logn)
Symmetric Load Balancing [1, 1.5] A & B 1 1 Ω(log n/ log logn)
w-Coordination Game [1.15, 1.21] A & B & C 1 Θ(w) Θ(w)
N -Star w-Coordination Game [1.15, 1.42] A & B & C 1 Θ(w) Θ(w)
Risk dominance/Regions of attraction: Risk dominance is an equilibrium refinement process
that centers around uncertainty about opponent behavior. A Nash equilibrium is considered risk
dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction4. The benchmark example is the Stag Hunt game,
shown in figure 1(a). In such symmetric 2x2 coordination games a strategy is risk dominant if it
is a best response to the uniformly random strategy of the opponent. We show that the likelihood
of the risk dominant equilibrium of the Stag Hunt game is 127(9 + 2
√
3pi) ≈ 0.7364 (instead of
merely knowing that it is at least 1/2, see figure 2). The size of the region of attraction of the
risk dominated equilibrium is 0.2636, whereas the mixed equilibrium has region of attraction of
zero measure. Moving to networks of coordination games, we show how to construct an oracle
that predicts the limit behavior of an arbitrary initial condition, in the case of coordination
games played over a star network with N agents. This is the most economic class of games that
exhibits two characteristics that intuitively seem to pose intractable obstacles to the quantitative
analysis of nonlinear systems: i) they have (arbitrarily many) free variables, ii) they exhibit a
continuum of equilibria.
2 Related Work
Set-wise convergence in congestion/potential games: A number of positive convergence
results have been established for concurrent dynamics [11, 4, 10, 3, 1, 17], however, they usually
depend on strong assumptions about network structure (e.g., load balancing games) and/or
symmetry of available strategies and/or are probabilistic in nature and/or establish convergence
2Our techniques extend to arbitrarily correlated beliefs, any prior over initial mixed strategies.
3We focus mostly on the makespan as a measure of social cost.
4Although risk dominance [13] was originally introduced as a hypothetical model of the method by which
perfectly rational players select their actions, it may also be interpreted [25] as the result of evolutionary processes.
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to approximate equilibria. On the contrary our convergence results are deterministic, hold for
any network structure and are point-wise.
Learning as a refinement/prediction mechanism in game theory: Price of anarchy-
like bounds in potential games using equilibrium stability refinements (e.g., stochastically stable
states) have been explored before [7, 2, 1]. Our approach and techniques are more expansive in
scope, since they also allow for computing the actual likelihoods of each equilibrium as well as
the topology of the regions of attractions of different equilibria.
We build upon positive performance results for replicator dynamics (and discrete-time
variants). The key reference is [17], where many key ideas including the fact that replicator
dynamics can significantly outperform worst case equilibria were introduced. This stability
analysis can be generalized to deterministic variants of replicator [21]. Replicator can outperform
even best case equilibria by converging to cycles [16, 19].
In independent parallel work [38] examine equilibrium selection issues in 2× 2 coordination
games for replicator dynamics, however, their techniques do not scale to larger games. Analyzing
the regions of attraction for (variants of) replicator dynamics in (time-evolving) games raises
interesting computational questions relevant to mathematical biology [23, 22].
[29] show how to use elements from the theory of topology of dynamical systems such as
chain recurrent sets to analyze learning dynamics in games. This solution concept generalizes the
notion of Nash equilibrium and captures the actual limit behavior of game dynamics. Combining
the ideas of regions of attraction with chain recurrent sets opens up interesting directions for
average case analysis of learning dynamics in non-potential games.
Regions of Attraction & Gradient Dynamics in Non-Convex Optimization: In
recent work, [18, 28] have shown how to combine tools from dynamical systems theory to
understand the behavior of one of the most classic optimization heuristics, deterministic discrete-
time fixed step-size gradient dynamics in general non-convex fitness landscapes. Specifically, it
is argued that saddle points (non-local minima fixed points) have regions of attraction of zero
measure and hence gradient dynamics typically converge to local minima.
Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we provide definitions in regards
to dynamical systems, congestion and network coordination games and the average price of
anarchy. In Section 4 we establish point-wise convergence of replicator dynamics for congestion
and network coordination games and we develop the mathematical machinery necessary for
approximating the average price of anarchy. In Section 5 we present our average price of anarchy
results. All the missing proofs can be found in the appendix.
3 Definitions and Basic Tools
Notation
We use boldface letters, e.g. x, to denote vectors and denote a vector’s ith coordinate by xi.
We use x−i to denote x after removing coordinate i-th. For a function f, we denote by fn the
composition of f with itself n times, namely f ◦ f ◦ · · · ◦ f︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
. We use J [x] to denote the Jacobian
matrix (of some function clear from the context) at the point x.
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3.1 Dynamical Systems
Let f : S → Rn be continuously differentiable with S ⊂ Rn, S an open set. We examine
continuous (time) dynamical systems of the form
dx
dt
= f(x). (1)
Since f is continuously differentiable, the ordinary differential equation (ode (1)) along with the
initial condition x(0) = x0 ∈ S has a unique solution for t ∈ I(x0) (some time interval) and
we can present it by φ(t,x0), called the flow of the system. φt(x0) ··= φ(t,x0) corresponds to a
function of time which captures the trajectory of the system with x0 the given starting point. It
is continuously differentiable, its inverse exists (denoted by φ−t(x0)) and is also continuously
differentiable (called diffeomorphism) in the so called maximal interval of existence I. It is
also true that φt ◦ φs = φt+s for t, s, t + s ∈ I and therefore φk = φk1 for k ∈ N (composition
of φ1 k times as long as 1, k ∈ I). x0 ∈ S is called an equilibrium if f(x0) = 0. In that case
holds φt(x0) = x0 for all t ∈ I, i.e., x0 is a fixed point of the function φt(x) for all t ∈ I. We
call x0 linearly stable if the eigenvalues of the Jacobian J [x0] of f (at the fixed point x0) have
non-positive real part.
If f is globally Lipschitz then the flow is defined for all t ∈ R, i.e., I = R. One way to enforce
the dynamical system to have a well-defined flow for all t ∈ R is to renormalize the vector field
by ‖f(x)‖ + 1, i.e., the resulting dynamical system will be dxdt = f(x)‖f(x)‖+1 , because the function
becomes globally 1-Lipschitz. The two dynamical systems (before and after renormalization) are
topologically equivalent ([30], p. 184). Formally this means that there exists a homeomorphism
H which maps trajectories of (1) onto trajectories of the renormalized flow and preserves the
direction of time. In words it means that the two systems have the same behavior/geometry
(same fixed points, convergence properties, phase portrait).
A Lyapunov (or potential) function V : S → R is a function that strictly decreases along
every non-trivial trajectory of the dynamical system. Formally, for continuous time dynamical
systems it holds that dVdt ≤ 0 with equality only when f(x) = 0. For more information on
dynamical systems see [30].
3.2 Average Performance of a system
Let µ be the Lebesgue measure on Rn and assume that µ(S) > 0. Given a dynamical system
(continuous time) we assume that limt→∞ φt(x) exists for all x ∈ S (the limit is called a limit
point); the system converges point-wise for all initial conditions. In this case, continuity implies
that every trajectory converges to some equilibrium (fixed point) of the dynamics.5
We would like to understand the average (long-term) behavior of the convergent system (e.g.,
if the initial condition is chosen uniformly at random from S). Intuitively, since the system
converges to fixed points, we would like each fixed point to be assigned weight proportional to its
region of attraction. We define the region of attraction of a fixed point x0 by Rx0 = {x ∈ S :
limt→∞ φt(x) = x0}, namely the set of starting points so that the dynamic converges to x0. Let
ψ(x) = limt→∞ φt(x), i.e., ψ maps each starting point x to the limit of the φt(x). It turns out
that ψ is measurable (see Lemma 7.1) and we can define the average (long-term) performance of
the system under some (utilitly/cost) function u. Let u : S → R be continuous then the average
(case) performance of a system is defined as
acpu ··=
∫
S u ◦ ψdµ
µ(S) = Ex∼U(S)[u(ψ(x))], (2)
5If limt→∞ ht(x) = y and h continuous then h(y) = y. Set h ··= φ1.
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where U(S) is the uniform distribution on S. u quantifies the quality of the points x ∈ S (e.g.,
social welfare in games). Observe that if m ··= minx∈FP u(x),M ··= maxx∈FP u(x) where FP de-
notes the set of fixed points6 then m ≤ acpu ≤M (a). We believe that computing/approximating
the average case performance is an important step towards understanding the actual behavior of
a system.
To see the connection with game theory, think of S as the set of mixed (randomized) strategies,
a fixed point with region of attraction of positive measure as a Nash equilibrium and u as the
social cost/welfare. In this case, integral (2) becomes a weighted average among the social
cost/welfare of the Nash equilibria. The average case performance is sandwiched between the
values (of the social cost/welfare) at the worst, best Nash equilibrium.
We use (continuous time) replicator dynamics on congestion and network coordination games
as our benchmark. In this case, the set of Nash equilibria is a subset of the set of fixed points.
Nevertheless, we can show that the dynamics converge point-wise and finally that Nash equilibria
are the only fixed points whose region of attraction may be of positive Lebesgue measure. Later
in this section we define the notion of average price of anarchy which is essentially a scaled
version of average performance, defined particularly for games.
Remark 3.1 (Generalizations of average case performance). The definition of average case
performance can be used for any point-wise convergent discrete time dynamical systems (function
ψ(x) will be equal to limk→∞ gk(x) where g is the rule of the discrete dynamics). Also, different
measures of efficiency can be defined where the initial condition follows some distribution other
than the uniform. Generally, the distribution over initial conditions, the notion of (social)
utility/cost, and the dynamic can all be treated as parameters of this performance measure.
3.3 Replicator Dynamics on Congestion/Network Coordination Games
Congestion Games
A congestion game is defined by the tuple (N ; E ; (Si)i∈N ; (ce)e∈E) where N is the set of agents
(with N = |N |), E is a set of resources (also known as edges or bins or facilities), and each
player i has a set Si of subsets of E (Si ⊆ 2E) and |Si| ≥ 2. Each strategy si ∈ Si is a set of
edges (a path), and ce is a cost (negative utility) function associated with facility e. We will also
use small greek characters like γ, δ to denote different strategies/paths. For a strategy profile
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ), the cost of player i is given by ci(s) =
∑
e∈si ce(`e(s)), where `e(s) is the
number of players using e in s (the load of edge e). In linear congestion games, the latency
functions are of the form ce(x) = aex+be where ae, be ≥ 0. Measures of social cost (sc(s)) include
the makespan, which is equal to the cost of the most expensive path and the sum of the costs of
all the agents.
Network (Polymatrix) Coordination Games
A coordination (or partnership) game is a two player game where in each strategy outcome both
agents receive the same utility. In other words, if we flip the sign of the utility of the first agent
then we get a zero-sum game. An N -player polymatrix (network) coordination game is defined
by an undirected graph G(V,E) with |V | = N vertices and each vertex corresponds to a player.
An edge (i, j) ∈ E(G) corresponds to a coordination game between players i, j. We assume that
we have the same strategy space S for every edge. Let Aij be the payoff matrix for the game
between players i, j and Aγδij be the payoff for both (coordination) if i, j choose strategies γ, δ
respectively. The set of players will be denoted by N and the set of neighbors of player i will be
denoted by N(i). For a strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ), the utility of player i is given by
ui(s) =
∑
j∈N(i)A
sisj
ij . The social welfare of a state s corresponds to the sum of the utilities of
all the agents sw(s) =
∑
i∈V ui(s).
6The set of fixed points in S is closed.
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The price of anarchy is defined as: PoA=
maxs∈NE Social Cost(s)
mins∗∈×iSi Social Cost(s∗)
for cost functions and
similarly PoA=
maxs∗∈×iSi Social Welfare(s∗)
mins∈NE Social Welfare(s)
for utilities.7
We denote by ∆(Si) = {p ≥ 0 :
∑
γ piγ = 1} the set of mixed (randomized) strategies of
player i and ∆ = ×i∆(Si) the set of mixed strategies of all players. For congestion games we use
ciγ = Es−i∼p−ici(γ, s−i) to denote the expected cost of player i given that he chooses strategy
γ and cˆi =
∑
δ∈Si piδciδ to denote his expected cost. Similarly, for network coordination games
we use uiγ = Es−i∼p−iui(γ, s−i) to denote the expected utility of player i given that he chooses
strategy γ and uˆi =
∑
δ∈Si piδuiδ to denote his expected utility.
Replicator Dynamics
Replicator dynamics is described by the following system of differential equations adjusted to cost
games (e.g., congestion games) and utility games (e.g., network coordination games) respectively:
dpiγ
dt
= piγ
(
cˆi − ciγ
)
,
dpiγ
dt
= piγ
(
uiγ − uˆi
)
(3)
for each i ∈ N , γ ∈ Si. Observe that if cˆi > ciγ then dpiγdt > 0, i.e., piγ is increasing with
time, thus player i tends to increase the probability he chooses strategy γ. Similarly if cˆi < ciγ
then dpiγdt < 0, i.e., piγ is decreasing with time, thus player i tends to decrease the probability
he chooses strategy γ.8 Replicator dynamics capture similarly rational behavior in the case of
network coordination games.
Remark 3.2. The fixed points of replicator dynamics are exactly the set of randomized strategies
such that each agent experiences equal costs across all strategies he chooses with positive probability.
This is a generalization of the notion of Nash equilibrium, since Nash equilibria furthermore
require that any strategy that is played with zero probability must have expected cost at least
as high as those strategies which are played with positive probability. Moreover, due to the
uniqueness theorem for solutions of ordinary differential equations, we have that the flow of
replicator dynamics is defined for all t ∈ R and initial conditions in ∆ [27].
3.3.1 Definition of average price of anarchy (APoA)
In this section we define the notion of average price of anarchy, following the machinery from
Section 3.2. It is natural to set S to be the product of simplexes ∆, but this does not suffice
since ∆ has measure zero in RM , where M ··=
∑
i |Si|. The reason is that the probabilities sum
up to one for each player. To circumvent this issue (since from Section 3.2 we need µ(S) > 0), we
consider a natural projection g of the points p ∈ ∆ to RM−N by excluding a specific but arbitrarily
chosen9 variable for each player. We denote g(∆) the “projected" product of simplexes and the
projection of any point p ∈ ∆ by g(p) (for example (p1,a, p1,b, p1,c, p2,a′ , p2,b′)→g (p1,a, p1,b, p2,a′)
where p1,a + p1,b + p1,c = 1 and p2,a′ + p2,b′ = 1)). Given a dynamical system10 which is defined
in g(∆) (projected set of mixed strategies) and which converges point-wise to fixed points, we
can define acpsc, acpsw to be the average case performance as in Section 3.2. For cost/utility
functions the average price of anarchy is defined as follows:
APoA=
acpsc
mins∗∈×iSi sc(s∗)
, APoA=
maxs∗∈×iSi sw(s∗)
acpsw
.
7NE denotes the set of Nash equilibria.
8Replicator dynamics describes rational behavior in a sense.
9Choose an arbitrary ordering of the strategies of each agent and then exclude the last strategy.
10We assume that this system describes the evolution of the mixed strategies of rational agents in some game.
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Remark 3.3. The definition of APoA does not rely on the fact that the games are congestion or
network coordination nor does it rely on replicator dynamics. Its only requirements is that given
a game we apply a dynamic that converges point-wise for all initial mixed strategies. Essentially
APoA is a scaled version of the average performance. In the next section we show that replicator
dynamics converges point-wise for congestion and network coordination games and also that the
fixed points (of replicator on these classes of games) with region of attraction of positive measure
are Nash equilibria. In particular APoA is well-defined.
4 Analysis of Replicator Dynamics in Potential Games
In this section we develop the mathematical machinery necessary for computing the average
case performance of replicator dynamics in different classes of potential games. Specifically, we
establish point-wise convergence of replicator dynamics for linear congestion games and arbitrary
networks of coordination games (Theorem 4.1). This allows us to define properly the average
case performance which is essentially equal to the weighted sum of the social cost/welfare of all
equilibria weighted by the cumulative measure/volume of all initial conditions that converge to
each (point-wise). Next, we show that the union of regions of attraction of (locally) unstable
equilibria is of measure zero (Theorem 4.5). Combining this result with a game theoretic
characterization of (un)stable equilibria in [17], known as weakly stable equilibria, establishes
that only weakly stable equilibria affect the average case system performance. The analysis here
is a strengthening of the techniques of [17] to carefully account for the possibility of continuums
of unstable equilibria. Finally, we still need to compute for each weakly stable equilibrium the
size of its region of attraction. The tool that is necessary for this is to establish invariants for
replicator dynamics in different classes of games. We present an information theoretic invariant
function (Theorem 4.8) for replicator dynamics for bipartite network coordination games. Such
invariant functions have been identified [31, 32] for network extensions of zero sum games [9, 5].
4.1 Poinwise Convergence
We show that replicator dynamics converges point-wise for the class of linear congestion and
network coordination games. The proof of the theorem has two steps. The first step is standard,
utilizes the potential function of the game and establishes convergence to equilibria sets. The
critical, second step is to construct a local Lyapunov function in some small neighborhood of a
limit point.
Theorem 4.1. Given any initial condition replicator dynamics converges to a fixed point (point-
wise convergence) in all linear congestion and network coordination games.
Proof. We will prove here the result in the case of linear congestion games. The argument for
network coordination games follows similar lines and is in the appendix 7.1.
We denote by cˆi the expected cost of agent i under mixed strategy profile p. Moreover, ciγ is
his expected cost when he deviates to strategy γ and all other agents still play according to p.
We observe that Ψ(p) =
∑
i cˆi +
∑
i,γ
∑
e∈γ(be + ae)piγ is a Lyapunov function since
∂Ψ
∂piγ
= ciγ +
∑
j 6=i
pjγ′
∂cjγ′
∂piγ
+
∑
e∈γ
(be + ae) = ciγ +
∑
j 6=i,γ′
∑
e∈γ∩γ′
aepjγ′ +
∑
e∈γ
(be + ae)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ciγ
= 2ciγ
and hence dΨdt =
∑
i,γ
∂Ψ
∂piγ
dpiγ
dt = −
∑
i,γ,γ′ piγpiγ′(ciγ − ciγ′)2 ≤ 0, with equality at fixed points.
Hence (as in [17]) we have convergence to equilibria sets (compact connected sets consisting of
fixed points). Next, we will argue that each trajectory has a unique (equilibrium) limit point.
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Let q be a limit point of the trajectory p(t). Wlog we can assume that p(0) is in the interior of
∆ and hence p(t) is in the interior of ∆ for all t ∈ R (we can assume that we start in the interior of ∆
otherwise we can just consider the subgame defined by the strategies that agents play with positive
probability.). We have that Ψ(q) ≤ Ψ(p(t)) where the equality holds only if we start at equilibrium.
We define the relative entropy I(p) = −∑i∑γ:qiγ>0 qiγ ln(piγ/qiγ) ≥ 0 (Jensen’s inequality) and
I(p) = 0 iff p = q. We denote by dˆi, diγ the expected costs of agent i under the mixed strategy
profile q.
dI
dt
= −
∑
i
∑
γ:qiγ>0
qiγ(cˆi − ciγ) = −
∑
i
cˆi +
∑
i,γ
qiγciγ
= −
∑
i
cˆi +
∑
i,γ
∑
e∈γ
(be + ae)qiγ +
∑
i,γ
∑
j 6=i
∑
γ′
∑
e∈γ∩γ′
aeqiγpjγ′
= −
∑
i
cˆi +
∑
i,γ
∑
e∈γ
(be + ae)qiγ +
∑
i,γ
∑
j 6=i
∑
γ′
∑
e∈γ∩γ′
aeqjγ′piγ
= −
∑
i
cˆi +
∑
i,γ
∑
e∈γ
(be + ae)qiγ −
∑
i,γ
∑
e∈γ
(be + ae)piγ +
∑
i,γ
piγ(diγ)
=
∑
i
dˆi −
∑
i
cˆi +
∑
i,γ
∑
e∈γ
(be + ae)qiγ −
∑
i,γ
∑
e∈γ
(be + ae)piγ −
∑
i,γ
piγ(dˆi − diγ)
= Ψ(q)−Ψ(p)−
∑
i,γ
piγ(dˆi − diγ)
The rest of the proof follows in a similar way to [20].
We break the term
∑
i,γ piγ(dˆi − diγ) to positive and negative terms (the zero terms can be
ignored), i.e.,
∑
i,γ piγ(dˆi − diγ) =
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
piγ(dˆi − diγ) +
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
piγ(dˆi − diγ)
Claim 4.2. There exists an  > 0 so that the function Z(p) = I(p) + 2
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
pi,γ has
dZ
dt < 0 for ‖p− q‖1 <  and Ψ(q) < Ψ(p).
To prove this claim, first assume that p→ q. We get cˆi− ciγ → dˆi−diγ for all i, γ. Hence for
small enough  > 0 with ‖p− q‖1 < , we have that cˆi − ciγ ≤ 34(dˆi − diγ) for the terms which
dˆi − diγ < 0. Therefore
dZ
dt
= Ψ(q)−Ψ(p)−
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
piγ(dˆi − diγ)−
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
piγ(dˆi − diγ) + 2
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
piγ(cˆi − ciγ)
≤ Ψ(q)−Ψ(p)−
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
piγ(dˆi − diγ)−
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
piγ(dˆi − diγ) + 3/2
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
piγ(dˆi − diγ)
= Ψ(q)−Ψ(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
−piγ(dˆi − diγ)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+1/2
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
piγ(dˆi − diγ)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
< 0
where we substitute piγdt = piγ(cˆi − ciγ) (replicator equations), and the claim is proved. Note that
Z(p) ≥ 0 (sum of non-negative terms and I(p) ≥ 0) and is zero iff p = q. (i)
To finish the proof of the theorem, let q be a non-trivial limit point of p(t) (i.e., p(0) is not
a fixed point). There exists an increasing sequence of times tn, with tn →∞ and p(tn)→ q. We
consider ′ such that the set C = {p : Z(p) < ′} is inside B = ‖p− q‖1 <  where  is from
claim above. Since p(tn)→ q, consider a time tN where p(tN ) is inside C. From the claim above
we get that Z(p) is decreasing inside B (and hence inside C), thus Z(p(t)) ≤ Z(p(tN )) < ′ for
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all t ≥ tN , hence the orbit will remain in C. By the fact that Z(p(t)) is decreasing in C (claim
above) and also Z(p(tn))→ Z(q) = 0 it follows that Z(p(t))→ 0 as t→∞. Hence p(t)→ q as
t→∞ using (i).
Remark 4.3. If the fixed points of the dynamics are isolated then a (global) Lyapunov function
suffices to show that the system converges point-wise (first step of the proof above). A fixed point
x0 is called isolated, if there exists an neighborhood of x0 so that x0 is the unique fixed point in
that neighborhood. However, this is not the case even in linear congestion games (see Lemma
8.16 for examples of linear congestion games with continuums of (Nash) equilibria).
4.2 Global Stability Analysis
Replicator dynamics in linear congestion games and network coordination games (as well as any
dynamic that converges point-wise) induces a probability distribution over the fixed points. The
probability assigned to each fixed point is proportional to the volume of its region of attraction.
The fixed points can be exponentially many or even accountable many, but as it is stated below
(corollary 4.6), only the weakly stable Nash equilibria have non-zero volumes of attraction.
Definition 4.4. [17] A Nash equilibrium is called weakly stable if given any two randomizing
agents, fixing one of the agents to choosing one of his strategies with probability one, leaves
the other agent indifferent between the strategies in his support. That is a Nash equilibrium
p is weakly stable if for any agents i, j and strategies γ, γ′ ∈ Si, δ ∈ Sj with piγ , piγ′ , pjδ > 0:
ci(γ, δ,p−ij) = ci(γ′, δ,p−ij).
[17] showed that in congestion games every stable fixed point is a weakly stable Nash
equilibrium. The following theorem (that assumes point-wise convergence) has as a corollary
that for all but a measure zero set of initial conditions replicator dynamics converges to a weakly
stable Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.5. The set of initial conditions for which the replicator converges to unstable fixed
points has measure zero in ∆ for linear congestion games and network coordination games.
Sketch. The proof of this theorem relies on dedicated machinery from topology and dynamical
systems theory. These tools and the complete proof are presented in detail in the appendix
7.2. The main conceptual steps are as follows: First, since the space of mixed strategy profiles
(i.e., products of simplices) are of zero measure in their native space we work with projections
on subspaces where the set of initial conditions has full measure. Due to a classic theorem in
dynamical systems (Center-Stable Manifold theorem) we have that the set of initial conditions
that stay trapped in a small enough neighborhood of an unstable equilibrium is a zero measure
set. Any initial condition that converges (pointwise) to this unstable fixed point must (at some
time t) reach points in this set. All of these initial conditions can thus be covered by a countable
union of preimages of the zero measure neighborhood implied by the Center-Stable Manifold
theorem. Due to the smoothness of the flow (a technical condition known as diffeomorphism)
these preimages must also be of zero measure and the countable union of zero measure sets imply
a zero measure region of attraction for each unstable equilibrium. The only remaining hurdle
is the case where the game has continuum of equilibria. In this case, although the region of
attraction of each equilibrium is of zero measure, their union could have positive measure. Due
to compactness of state space, we argue that it suffices to cover each (unstable) equilibrium
set with a finite cover of (zero-measure) neighborhoods. At this point standard union bound
arguments suffice to complete the argument.
This theorem extends to all congestion games for which the replicator dynamics converges
point-wise (e.g., games with finite equilibria). Combining theorem 4.5 with the weakly stable
characterization of [17] which holds for all congestion/potential games, we get the following:
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Corollary 4.6. In linear congestion games and network coordination games, for all but a measure
zero set of initial conditions, replicator dynamics converges (point-wise) to weakly stable Nash
equilibria.
4.3 Invariant Functions from Information Theory
We have established that all attracting (i.e., asymptotically stable) fixed points are weakly stable
Nash equilibria. We still need to characterize and compute the regions of attraction of these
equilibria. The key idea here is to characterize the boundaries of the regions of attraction. This
is due to the following theorem:
Theorem 4.7. [15] If q is an asymptotically stable equilibrium point for a system x˙ = f(x)
where f ∈ C1, then its region of attraction Rq is an invariant set whose boundaries are formed
by trajectories.
If we identify a (continuous) invariant function f , i.e., a function that remains constant on
any trajectory, and q is a (limit) point of the trajectory then the whole trajectory lies on the set
{x : f(x) = f(q)}. If we identify more invariant functions f1, f2, . . . , fk then the whole trajectory
lies on the set {x : f1(x) = f1(q) ∧ f2(x) = f2(q) ∧ · · · ∧ fk(x) = fk(q)}. By identifying enough
invariant functions, we can derive an exact algebraic description of the trajectory.
By our point-wise convergence result each trajectory converges to an equilibrium. So each
point of the state space that does not belong in the region of attraction of a weakly stable
equilibrium, must converge to an unstable equilibrium. By computing the (union of) regions of
attraction of all unstable equilibria we can understand how they partition the state space into
regions of attractions for the asymptotically stable equilibria11. All points on the stable manifold
of unstable fixed point q lie on the set {x : f1(x) = f1(q) ∧ f2(x) = f2(q) ∧ · · · ∧ fk(x) = fk(q)}
where f1, . . . , fk the invariant functions of the dynamic. Such descriptions can allow for exact
computation of volumes of regions of attraction (Section 5.1), approximate volume computation
(Section 5.2), designing efficient oracles for testing if an initial condition belongs to the region of
attraction of an equilibrium (Section 5.3), and computing average system performance, amongst
other applications.
The following lemma that identifies invariants functions in bipartite coordination games follows
straightforwardly from prior work on identifying invariant functions for network generalizations
of (linear transformations of) zero-sum games [31, 32]). To prove any such statement it suffices
to compute the time derivatives of these functions along any trajectory and show them to be
equal to zero.
Lemma 4.8. Let p(t) = (p1(t), ...,pN (t)) be a trajectory of replicator dynamics when applied
to a bipartite network of coordination games that has a fully mixed Nash equilibrium q =
(q1, ...,qN ) then the function
∑
i∈Vleft H(qi,pi(t)) −
∑
i∈Vright H(qi,pi(t)) is (time-)invariant,
where H(x,y) = −∑i xi ln yi.
The cross entropy between the Nash q and the state of the system, however is equal to the
summation of the K-L divergence between these two distributions and the entropy of q. Since
the entropy of q is constant, we derive the following corollary (rephrasing the previous lemma):
Corollary 4.9. Let p(t) be a trajectory of the replicator dynamic when applied to a bipartite
network of coordination games that has a fully mixed Nash equilibrium q then the K-L divergence
between q and the p(t) is constant, i.e., does not depend on t.
11The region of attraction of an unstable equilibrium is referred to as the stable manifold of the (unstable) fixed
point.
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Stag Hare
Stag 5, 5 0, 4
Hare 4, 0 2, 2
(a) Stag Hunt game
Stag Hare
Stag 1, 1 0, 0
Hare 0, 0 w, w
(b) w-coordination game
Figure 1:
Figure 2: Vector field of replicator dynamics in Stag Hunt.
5 Applications of Average Case Analysis
We will use the tools we have developed in the previous section to compute the regions of
attractions and find the average case performance of replicator dynamics in classic game theoretic
settings. The games we examine are: the Stag Hunt game, (parametric) coordination games,
polymatrix coordination games played over a star as well as symmetric linear load balancing
games.
5.1 Exact Quantitative Analysis of Risk Dominance in the Stag Hunt Game
The Stag Hunt game (figures 1(a)) has two pure Nash, (Stag, Stag) and (Hare,Hare) and a
symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium where each agent chooses strategy Hare with probability
2/3. Stag Hunt replicator trajectories are equivalent those of a coordination game with w = 2.12
Coordination games are potential games where the potential function in each state is equal
to the utility of each agent. Since the mixed Nash is not weakly stable replicator dynamics
converges to pure Nash equilibria for all but a zero measure of initial conditions (Theorem 4.5).
When we study the replicator dynamic here, it suffices to examine its projection in the subspace
p1s × p2s ⊂ (0, 1)2 which captures the evolution of the probability that each agent assigns to
strategy Stag (see figure 2). Using the invariant property of lemma 4.8, we compute the size of
each region of attraction in this space and thus provide a quantitative analysis of risk dominance
in the classic Stag Hunt game.
Theorem 5.1. The region of attraction of (Hare,Hare) is the subset of (0, 1)2 that satisfies p2s <
1
2(1− p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s) and has Lebesgue measure 127(9 + 2
√
3pi) ≈ 0.7364. The region of
attraction of (Stag, Stag) is the subset of (0, 1)2 that satisfies p2s > 12(1−p1s+
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s)
and has Lebesgue measure 127(18 − 2
√
3pi) ≈ 0.2636. The stable manifold of the mixed Nash
equilibrium satisfies the equation p2s = 12(1 − p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s) and has zero Lebesgue
measure.
12If both agents reduce their payoff of their first strategy by 4, the replicator trajectories remain invariant. This
results to a w-coordination game with w = 2.
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Proof. In the case of Stag Hunt games, one can verify in a straightforward manner (via substitu-
tion) that
d
(
2
3
ln(φ1s(t,p))+
1
3
ln(φ1h(t,p))− 23 ln(φ2s(t,p))− 13 ln(φ2h(t,p))
)
dt = 0, where φiγ(t,p), corresponds
to the probability that each agent i assigns to strategy γ at time t given initial condition p.
This is a special case of corollary 4.9. We use this invariant function to identify the stable and
unstable manifold of the interior Nash q.
Given any point p of the stable manifold of q, we have that by definition limt→∞ φ(t,p) = q.
Similarly for the unstable manifold, we have that limt→−∞ φ(t,p) = q. The time-invariant
property implies that for all such points (belonging to the stable or unstable manifold), 23 ln(p1s)+
1
3 ln(1− p1s)−23 ln(p2s)− 13 ln(1− p2s) = 23 ln(q1h) + 13 ln(1− q1h)−23 ln(q2h)− 13 ln(1− q2h) = 0,
since the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is symmetric. This condition is equivalent to p21s(1 −
p1s) = p
2
2s(1 − p2s), where 0 < p1s, p2s < 1. It is straightforward to verify that this algebraic
equation is satisfied by the following two distinct solutions, the diagonal line (p2s = p1s) and
p2s =
1
2(1− p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s). Below, we show that these manifolds correspond indeed
to the state and unstable manifold of the mixed Nash, by showing that this Nash equilibrium
satisfies these equations and by establishing that the vector field is tangent everywhere along
them.
The case of the diagonal is trivial and follows from the symmetric nature of the game. We verify
the claims about p2s = 12(1− p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s). Indeed, the mixed equilibrium point in
which p1s = p2s = 2/3 satisfies the above equation. We establish that the vector filed is tangent to
this manifold by showing in Lemma 8.1 that ∂p2s∂p1s =
dp2s
dt
dp1s
dt
··= p2s
(
u2(s)−(p2su2(s)+(1−p2s)u2(h))
)
p1s
(
u1(s)−(p1su1(s)+(1−p1s)u1(h))
) , where
the last equality is derived by the definition of replicator dynamics. Finally, this manifold is indeed
attracting to the equilibrium. Since the function p2s = y(p1s) = 12(1− p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s) is
a strictly decreasing function of p1s in [0,1] and satisfies y(2/3) = 2/3, this implies that its graph
is contained in the subspace
(
0 < p1s < 2/3 ∩ 2/3 < p2s < 1
) ∪ (2/3 < p1s < 1 ∩ 0 < p2s < 2/3).
In each of these subsets
(
0 < p1s < 2/3 ∩ 2/3 < p2s < 1
)
,
(
2/3 < p1s < 1 ∩ 0 < p2s < 2/3
)
the
replicator vector field coordinates have fixed signs that “push” p1s, p2s towards their respective
mixed equilibrium values.
The stable manifold partitions the set 0 < p1s, p2s < 1 into two subsets, each of which is
flow invariant since the unstable manifold itself is flow invariant. Our convergence analysis
for the generalized replicator flow implies that in each subset all but a measure zero of initial
conditions must converge to its respective pure equilibrium. The size of the lower region of
attraction13 is equal to the following definite integral
∫ 1
0
1
2(1 − p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s)dx =[
1/2
(
p1s − p
2
1s
2 + (−16 + p1s2 )
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s −
2arcsin[ 1
2
(1−3p1s)]
3
√
3
)]1
0
= 127(9 + 2
√
3pi) = 0.7364
and the theorem follows.
5.2 Average Price of Anarchy Analysis in Coordination/Consensus Games
via Polytope Approximations of Regions of Attraction
Theorem 5.2. The average price of anarchy of a w-coordination game with w ≥ 1 is at most
w2+w
w2+1
and at least w(w+1)
2
w(w+1)2−2w+2 .
Sketch. For w-coordination games it is straightforward to see that pw1s(1− p1s)− pw2s(1− p2s)
is an invariant property of the replicator system (follows from lemma 4.8). The presence of the
parameter w on the exponent precludes the existence of a simple, explicit, parametric description
of all the solutions. We analyze the topology of the basins of attractions and produce simple
subsets/supersets polytope approximations of them (see figure 2). The volume of these polytope
approximations can be computed explicitly and these measures can be used to provide upper
and lower bounds on the average case system performance and average price of anarchy. We
present the complete proof in the appendix 8.2.
13This corresponds to the risk dominant equilibrium (Hare,Hare).
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(a) Examples of stable man-
ifolds for different mixed
Nash.
(b) Stable manifolds lie on
the intersection of level sets
of invariant functions.
Figure 3: Star network coordination game with 3 agents
By combining the exact analysis of the standard Stag Hunt game (theorem 5.1), theorem 5.2
and optimizing over w we derive that:
Corollary 5.3. The average price of anarchy of the class of w-coordination games with w > 0
is at least 2
1+ 9+2
√
3pi
27
≈ 1.15 and at most 4+3
√
2
4+2
√
2
≈ 1.21. In comparison, the price of anarchy for
this class of games is unbounded.
5.3 Coordination/Consensus Games on a Star Graph
In this subsection we show how to estimate the topology of regions of attraction for star networks
of w-coordination games. This corresponds to strategic settings where some agents again need to
reach consensus but where there is an agent who works as a center communicating with all agents
at once. The price of anarchy and stability of these games remain unchanged as we increase
the size of the star. Specifically the price of stability is equal to 1 whereas the price of anarchy
can become arbitrarily large for large enough w. We will argue once again that the average
performance is approximately optimal.
This game has two pure Nash equilibria where all agents either play the first strategy (i.e.,
Stag), or the second (i.e., Hare). For simplicity in notation sometimes we denote the first
strategy, i.e., Stag, as strategy A and the other strategy, i.e., Hare, as strategy B. This game
has a continuum of mixed Nash equilibria. Our goal is to produce an oracle which given as input
an initial condition outputs the resulting equilibrium that system converges to.
Example. In order to gain some intuition on the construction of these oracles let’s focus on
the minimal case with a continuum of equilibria (N = 3 agents/vertices, center agent with n = 2
neighbors). Since each agent has two strategies it suffices to depict for each one the probability
with which they choose strategy A (the “bad" Stag strategy). Hence, the phase space can be
depicted in 3 dimensions. Figure 3 depicts this phase space. The point (0, 0, 0) captures the
good pure Nash (all B), whereas the point (1, 1, 1) the bad pure Nash (all A). There is also
a continuum of unstable mixed Nash equilibria. Specifically, it suffices that the center player
chooses A with probability w/(w + 1) and the summation of the probabilities that the two other
agents assign to A is exactly 2w/(w + 1). In figure 3, we have chosen w = 2. The continuum of
equilibria corresponds to the red straight line. These are unstable equilibria and by Theorem
4.5 almost all initial conditions are attracted to the two attracting pure Nash. For any mixed
Nash equilibrium there exists a curve (co-dimension 2) of points that converge to it. Figure 3(a)
depicts several such stable manifolds for sample mixed equilibria along the equilibrium line. The
union of these stable manifolds partitions the state space into two regions, one attracting to
equilibrium (A,A,A) and the other attracting to the equilibrium (B,B,B)). Hence, in order
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to construct our oracle it suffices to have a description of these attracting curves for the mixed
equilibria. However, as shown in figure 3(b), we have identified two distinct invariant functions
for the replicator dynamic in this system. Given any mixed Nash equilibrium, the set of points
of the state space which agree with the value of each of these invariant functions define a set
of co-dimension one (the double hollow cone and the curved plane). Any points that converge
to this equilibrium must lie on the intersection of these sets (black curve). In fact, due to our
point-wise convergence theorem, it immediately follows that this intersection is exactly the stable
manifold of the unstable equilibrium. The case for general N(= n+ 1) works analogously, but
now we need to identify N − 1 (= n, equal to the number of neighbors) invariant functions in an
algorithmic, efficient manner.
Oracle
1. Input: Initial condition (x1(0), . . . , xn(0), y(0))
2. Output: A or B or mixed
3. If
∑
xi(0) > (≥) ww+1n and y(0) ≥ (>) ww+1 return A.
4. If
∑
xi(0) < (≤) ww+1n and y(0) ≤ (<) ww+1 return B.
5. Compute by solving system 8-9 x1, . . . , xn (binary search)
6. Let f(ρ) =
(
ρ(w+1)
w
) w
w+1
[(1− ρ)(w + 1)] 1w+1 −∏i (xi(0)xi )xi (1−xi(0)1−xi )1−xi
7. if (
∑
i xi(0) >
w
w+1n and f(y(0)) < 0) or
(
∑
i xi(0) <
w
w+1n and f(y(0)) > 0) return B.
8. if (
∑
i xi(0) >
w
w+1n and f(y(0)) > 0) or
(
∑
i xi(0) <
w
w+1n and f(y(0)) < 0) return A.
9. return mixed fixed point (x1, . . . , xn, ww+1)
The proof of correctness of the algorithm is presented in Appendix 8.3. Given this oracle, we
establish an upper bound of 1.42 for the average price of anarchy, which is independent both of
w as well as the size of the star.
Corollary 5.4. The average price of anarchy for the class of star w-coordination games (with
n+ 1 agents) is at most 1.42.
5.4 Average price of anarchy of linear, symmetric load balancing games
In this subsection, we state the following bounds on the average price of anarchy of linear,
symmetric load balancing games.
Theorem 5.5. The average price of anarchy in terms of makespan of symmetric, linear load
balancing games is at most 3/2. Moreover, generically, the average price of anarchy of symmetric,
linear load balancing games is 1. Specifically, given any number of agents and machines, the set
of linear latency functions such that the average price of anarchy of the resulting game is greater
than 1 is a zero measure set within the set of all linear latency functions.
For the classic game of N -balls N -bins we can show the following theorem:
Theorem 5.6. The average price of anarchy in terms of makespan for the (identical) N -balls
N -bins is 1.
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6 Conclusion and Open questions
We define an average case analysis notion in dynamical systems focusing on games and replicator
dynamics. We call this notion average price of anarchy (APoA) and provide upper and lower
bounds for APoA in different classes of games. Several questions arise:
• Other settings/games/mechanisms. In recent followup work, [35] applies our approach
to peer prediction mechanisms where the size of the basin of attraction of the truthful
equilibrium is used as a proxy for the robustness of truthful play. The replicator model
predicts/confirms the significant improvement in robustness of recent mechanisms over
earlier approaches. It would be interesting to test the robustness of other (approximately)
truthful, differentially private mechanisms in a similar manner.
• Other dynamics. Perform average case analysis for other dynamics and compare them
against replicator dynamics.
• Generalization of APoA. Generalize the notion of APoA to dynamics that do not
necessarily converge. In particular, it would be intriguing to define an APoA notion for
chain recurrent sets (see [29]).
• Point-wise convergence. Generalize the point-wise convergence result to a larger class
of congestion games, (e.g., for polynomial cost functions), as well as extend the point-wise
convergence result for linear cost functions to other dynamics.
• Volumes of regions of attraction as a function. Given a prior distribution over
initial conditions (e.g., uniform), every point-wise convergent dynamical system induces a
probability distribution over fixed points. By approximating this function (from priors over
initial conditions to posteriors over equilibria), we can predict the average case (long-term)
behavior of the system (without having the equations of the dynamics). This interpretation
of a game, as an experiment/measurement that maps the outside observer’s original beliefs
over initial mixed strategies/beliefs of the agents to (sampling from) a distribution/belief
over the resulting equilibria, resolves the non-determinism problem linked to the multiplicity
equilibria in a game. The unique, well-defined, deterministic prediction is the function
from distributions over initial conditions to distributions over equilibria. Naturally, if the
initial distribution is concentrated on a single equilibrium then the output of the prediction
function will similarly be concentrated on that equilibrium. Nontrivial distributions will
result to a (unique) distribution/prediction that puts positive measure on several equilibria.
Developing a formal theory for approximating such functions seems like a fertile ground for
combining ideas from computer science and game theory.
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APPENDIX
7 Missing proofs and lemmas from Sections 3 and 4
Lemma 7.1. ψ(x) is a measurable function.
Proof. For an arbitrary c ∈ R we have that
{x : ψ(x)i < c} = ∪∞k=1 ∪∞m=1 ∩∞n>m{x : φn(x)i < c−
1
k
}}.
The set {x : φn(x)i < c− 1k} is measurable since φn(x)i is a (Lebesgue) measurable function (by
continuity). Therefore ψ(x)i is a measurable function.
7.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1 for network coordination games
Proof. We denote by uˆi the expected utility of agent i under mixed strategy profile p and by uiγ
his expected utility when he deviates to strategy γ and all other agents still play according to p.
We observe that
Ψ(p) =
∑
i
uˆi =
∑
i,γ
piγ
∑
j∈N(i)
∑
δ
Aγδij pjδ
is a Lyapunov function for our game since (strictly increasing along the trajectories)
∂Ψ
∂piγ
= uiγ +
∑
j∈N(i)
∑
δ
Aδγji pjδ = 2uiγ since Aij = A
T
ji
and hence
dΨ
dt
=
∑
i,γ
∂Ψ
∂piγ
dpiγ
dt
=
∑
i,γ,γ′
piγpiγ′(uiγ − uiγ′)2 ≥ 0
with equality at fixed points. Hence (as in [17]) we have convergence to equilibrium sets (compact
connected sets consisting entirely of fixed points). We address the fact that this doesn’t suffice
for pointwise convergence. To be exact it suffices only in the case the equilibria are isolated
(which is not the case for network coordination games - see figure 3).
Let q be a limit point of the trajectory p(t). W.l.o.g we can assume that p(0) is in the
interior of ∆ and hence p(t) is in the interior of ∆ for all t ∈ R (we can assume that we start
in the interior of ∆ otherwise we can just consider the subgame defined by the strategies that
agents play with positive probability.). We have that Ψ(q) ≥ Ψ(p(t)) where the equality holds
only if we start at equilibrium. We define the relative entropy.
I(p) = −
∑
i
∑
γ:qiγ>0
qiγ ln(piγ/qiγ) ≥ 0 (Jensen’s inequality)
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and I(p) = 0 iff p = q. We get that
dI
dt
= −
∑
i
∑
γ:qiγ>0
qiγ(uiγ − uˆi)
=
∑
i
uˆi −
∑
i,γ
qiγuiγ
=
∑
i
uˆi −
∑
i,γ
∑
j∈N(i)
∑
δ
Aγδij pjδqiγ
=
∑
i
uˆi −
∑
j,δ
∑
i∈N(j)
∑
γ
Aγδij pjδqiγ (since Aij = A
T
ji)
=
∑
i
uˆi −
∑
j,δ
pjδdjδ
=
∑
i
uˆi −
∑
i
dˆi −
∑
j,δ
pjδ(djδ − dˆj)
= Ψ(p)−Ψ(q)−
∑
i,γ
piγ(diγ − dˆi)
where diγ , dˆi correspond to the payoff of agent i if he chooses strategy γ and his expected payoff
respectively at point q. The rest of the proof follows in a similar way to Losert and Akin [20].
We break the term
∑
i,γ piγ(diγ − dˆi) to positive and negative terms (we ignore zero terms),
i.e.,
∑
i,γ piγ(diγ − dˆi) =
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
piγ(diγ − dˆi) +
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
piγ(diγ − dˆi).
Claim: There exists an  > 0 so that the function Z(p) = I(p) + 2
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
pi,γ has dZdt < 0
for ‖p− q‖1 <  and Ψ(q) > Ψ(p).
Assuming that p→ q, we get uiγ − uˆi → diγ − dˆi for all i, γ. Hence for small enough  > 0 with
‖p− q‖1 < , we have that uiγ − uˆi ≤ 34(diγ − dˆi) for the terms which diγ − dˆi < 0. Therefore
dZ
dt
= Ψ(p)−Ψ(q)−
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
piγ(diγ − dˆi)−
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
piγ(diγ − dˆi) + 2
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
piγ(uiγ − uˆi)
≤ Ψ(p)−Ψ(q)−
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
piγ(diγ − dˆi)−
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
piγ(diγ − dˆi) + 3/2
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
piγ(diγ − dˆi)
= Ψ(p)−Ψ(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∑
i,γ:dˆi<diγ
−piγ(diγ − dˆi)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+1/2
∑
i,γ:dˆi>diγ
piγ(diγ − dˆi)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
< 0
where we substitute piγdt = piγ(uiγ − uˆi) (replicator), and the claim is proved.
Note that Z(p) ≥ 0 (sum of nonnegative terms and I(p) ≥ 0) and is zero iff p = q. (i)
To finish the proof of the theorem, if q is a limit point of p(t), there exists an increasing
sequence of times tn, with tn → ∞ and p(tn) → q. We consider ′ such that the set C = {p :
Z(p) < ′} is inside B = ‖p− q‖1 <  where  is from claim above. Since p(tn)→ q, consider
a time tN where p(tN ) is inside C. From claim above we get that Z(p) is decreasing inside B
(and hence inside C), thus Z(p(t)) ≤ Z(p(tN )) < ′ for all t ≥ tN , hence the orbit will remain in
C. By the fact that Z(p(t)) is decreasing in C (claim above) and also Z(p(tn))→ Z(q) = 0 it
follows that Z(p(t))→ 0 as t→∞. Hence p(t)→ q as t→∞ using (i).
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7.2 Proof of Theorem 4.5
To prove the theorem we will use the Center-Stable Manifold theorem (see Theorem 7.2). In
order to do that we need a map whose domain is full-dimensional. However, a simplex in Rn has
dimension n− 1. Therefore, we need to take a projection of the domain space and accordingly
redefine the map of the dynamical system. We note that the projection we take will be fixed point
dependent; this is to keep the proof that every stable fixed point is a weakly stable Nash proved
in [17] relatively less involved later. Let q be a point of our state space ∆ and Σ = | ∪i Si|. Let
hq : [N ]→ [Σ] be a function such that hq(i) = γ if qiγ > 0 for some γ ∈ Si. Let M =
∑ |Si| and
g a fixed projection where you exclude the first coordinate of every agent’s distribution vector.
We consider the mapping zq : RM → RM−N so that we exclude from each agent i the variable
pi,hq(i) (zq plays the same role as g but we drop variables with a specific property this time, those
played with positive probability). We substitute the variables pi,hq(i) with 1−
∑
γ∈Si
γ 6=hq(i)
piγ .
The formal statement of the Center-Stable manifold theorem has as follows:
Theorem 7.2. (Center and Stable Manifolds, p. 65 of [36]) Let 0 be a fixed point for the Cr
local differomorphism f : U → Rn where U ⊂ Rn is a neighborhood of zero in Rn and r ≥ 1. Let
Es⊕Ec⊕Eu be the invariant splitting of Rn into generalized eigenspaces of Df(0) corresponding
to eigenvalues of absolute value less than one, equal to one, and greater than one. To the Df(0)
invariant subspace Es ⊕Ec there is associated a local f invariant Cr embedded disc W scloc tangent
to the linear subspace at 0 and a ball B around zero such that:
f(W scloc) ∩B ⊂W scloc. If fn(x) ∈ B for all n ≥ 0, then x ∈W scloc (4)
For t = 1 and an unstable fixed point p we consider the function ψ1,p(x) = zp ◦ φ1 ◦ z−1p (x)
which is C1 diffeomorphism, where φ1 is the time one map of the flow of the dynamical system
in ∆ (we assume we do the renormalization trick described in Section 3.1). Let Bzp(p) be the
ball that is derived from 7.2 and we consider the union of these balls (transformed in RM )
A = ∪pAzp(p)
where Azp(p) = g ◦ z−1p (Bzp(p)) (z−1p "returns" the set Bzp(p) back to RM ). Taking advantage of
separability of RM we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.3. (Lindelőf ’s lemma) For every open cover there is a countable subcover.
Therefore we can find a countable subcover for A = ∪pAzp(p), i.e., A = ∪∞m=1Azpm (pm).
Let ψn,p(x) = zp ◦ φn ◦ z−1p (x). If a point x ∈ g(∆) (which corresponds to g−1(x) in our
original ∆) has as unstable fixed point as a limit, there must exist a n0 and m so that
ψn,pm ◦ zpm ◦ g−1(x) ∈ Bzpm (pm) for all n ≥ n0 and therefore again from 7.2 and the fact
that ∆ is invariant we get that we get that ψn0,pm ◦ zpm ◦ g−1(x) ∈ (W scloc zpm (pm) ∩ zpm(∆)),
hence x ∈ g ◦ z−1pm ◦ ψ−1n0,pm(W scloc zpm (pm) ∩ zpm(∆)).
Hence, the set of points in g(∆) whose ω-limit has an unstable equilibrium, is a subset of
C = ∪∞m=1 ∪∞n=1 g ◦ z−1pm ◦ ψ−1n,pm(W scloc zpm (pm) ∩ zpm(∆)) (5)
Observe that the dimension of W scloc zpm (pm) is at most M −N − 1 since we assume that pm is
unstable (Jpm has an eigenvalue with positive real part)14 and thus dimEu ≥ 1, hence the set
(W scloc zpm (pm)
∩ zpm(∆)) has Lebesgue measure zero in RM−N . Finally since g ◦ z−1pm ◦ ψ−1n,pm :
14Here we used the fact that the eigenvalues with absolute value less than one, one and greater than one of eA
correspond to eigenvalues with negative real part, zero real part and positive real part respectively of A
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RM−N → RM−N ) is continuously differentiable in an open neighborhood of g(∆), ψn,pm is C1
and hence locally Lipschitz in that neighborhood (see [30] p.71) and it preserves the null-sets (see
Lemma 7.4). Namely, C is a countable union of measure zero sets, i.e., is measure zero as well.
Since the dynamical system after renormalization is topologically equivalent with the system
before renormalization, Theorem 4.5 follows.
Lemma 7.4. Let g : Rn → Rn be a locally Lipschitz function, then g is null-set preserving, i.e.,
for E ⊂ Rn if E has measure zero then g(E) has also measure zero.
Proof. Let Bγ be an open ball such that ‖g(y)− g(x)‖2 ≤ Kγ ‖y − x‖2 for all x,y ∈ Bγ . We
consider the union ∪γBγ which cover Rn by the assumption that g is locally Lipschitz. By
Lindelőf’s lemma we have a countable subcover, i.e., ∪∞i=1Bi. Let Ei = E ∩ Bi. We will
prove that g(Ei) has measure zero. Fix an  > 0. Since Ei ⊂ E, we have that Ei has
measure zero, hence we can find a countable cover of open balls C1, C2, . . . for Ei, namely
Ei ⊂ ∪∞j=1Cj so that Cj ⊂ Bi for all j and also
∑∞
j=1 µ(Cj) <

Kni
. Since Ei ⊂ ∪∞j=1Cj we get
that g(Ei) ⊂ ∪∞j=1g(Cj), namely g(C1), g(C2), . . . cover g(Ei) and also g(Cj) ⊂ g(Bi) for all j.
Assuming that ball Cj ≡ B(x, r) (center x and radius r) then it is clear that g(Cj) ⊂ B(g(x),Kir)
(g maps the center x to g(x) and the radius r to Kir because of Lipschitz assumption). But
µ(B(g(x),Kir)) = K
n
i µ(B(x, r)) = K
n
i µ(Cj), therefore µ(g(Cj)) ≤ Kni µ(Cj) and so we conclude
that
µ(g(Ei)) ≤
∞∑
j=1
µ(g(Cj)) ≤ Kni
∞∑
j=1
µ(Cj) < 
Since  was arbitrary, it follows that µ(g(Ei)) = 0. To finish the proof, observe that g(E) =
∪∞i=1g(Ei) and therefore µ(g(E)) ≤
∑∞
i=1 µ(g(Ei)) = 0.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 4.8
Proof. The derivative of
∑
i∈Vleft
∑
γ∈Si qiγ · ln(piγ)−
∑
i∈Vright
∑
γ∈Si qiγ · ln(piγ) has as follows:
∑
i∈Vleft
∑
γ∈Si
qiγ
d ln(piγ)
dt
−
∑
i∈Vright
∑
γ∈Si
qiγ
d ln(piγ)
dt
=
∑
i∈Vleft
∑
γ∈Si
qiγ
p˙iγ
piγ
−
∑
i∈Vright
∑
γ∈Si
qiγ
p˙iγ
piγ
=
=
∑
i∈Vleft
∑
(i,j)∈E
(
qi
TAijpj − piTAijpj
)− ∑
i∈Vright
∑
(i,j)∈E
(
qi
TAijpj − piTAijpj
)
=
=
∑
i∈Vleft
∑
(i,j)∈E
(
qi
T − piT
)
Aijpj −
∑
i∈Vright
∑
(i,j)∈E
(
qi
T − piT
)
Aijpj =
=
∑
i∈Vleft
∑
(i,j)∈E
(
qi
T − piT
)
Aij(pj − qj)−
∑
i∈Vright
∑
(i,j)∈E
(
qi
T − piT
)
Aij(pj − qj) =
= −
∑
(i,j)∈E,i∈Vleft,j∈Vright
[(
qi
T − piT
)
Aij(qj − pj)−
(
qj
T − pjT
)
Aji(qi − pi)
]
= 0
where the second to last line follows from the fact that q = (q1, . . . ,qN ) is a fully mixed Nash equi-
librium. The last equality follows from the fact that all edge/games are coordination/partnership
games, i.e., ATji = Aij .
8 Missing proofs and lemmas of section 5
8.1 Missing proof of technical lemma in 5.1
The following technical lemma argues that the vector filed of the replicator dynamic in the Stag
Hunt game is tangent to the curve p2s = 12(1− p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s).
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Lemma 8.1. For any 0 < p1s, p2s < 1, with p2s = 12(1− p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s) we have that:
∂p2s
∂p1s
=
dp2s
dt
dp1s
dt
=
p2s
(
u2(s)− (p2su2(s) + (1− p2s)u2(h))
)
p1s
(
u1(s)− (p1su1(s) + (1− p1s)u1(h))
)
Proof. By substitution of the Stag Hunt game utilities, we have that:
ζ2s
ζ1s
=
p2s
(
u2(s)− (p2su2(s) + (1− p2s)u2(h))
)
p1s
(
u1(s)− (p1su1(s) + (1− p1s)u1(h))
) = p2s(1− p2s)(3p1s − 2)
p1s(1− p1s)(3p2s − 2) (6)
However, p2s(1− p2s) = 12p1s(p1s − 1 +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s). Combining this with (6),
ζ2s
ζ1s
=
1
2
(p1s − 1 +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s)(3p1s − 2)
(1− p1s)(3p2s − 2) =
1
2
(
√
1 + 3p1s −
√
1− p1s)(3p1s − 2)√
1− p1s · (3p2s − 2) (7)
Similarly, we have that 3p2s − 2 = 12
√
1 + 3p1s · (3
√
1− p1s −
√
1 + 3p1s). By multiplying
and dividing equation (7) with (
√
1 + 3p1s + 3
√
1− p1s) we get:
ζ2s
ζ1s
=
1
2
(
√
1 + 3p1s + 3
√
1− p1s)(
√
1 + 3p1s −
√
1− p1s)(3p1s − 2)
2
√
1− p1s ·
√
1 + 3p1s · (2− 3p1s)
= −1
4
(
√
1 + 3p1s + 3
√
1− p1s)(
√
1 + 3p1s −
√
1− p1s)√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s)
=
1
2
(− 1 + 1− 3p1s√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s
)
=
∂
(
1
2(1− p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s)
)
∂p1s
=
∂p2s
∂p1s
.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
For any w, a w-coordination game is a potential game and therefore it is payoff equivalent to
a congestion game. The only two weakly stable equilibria are the pure ones, hence in order to
understand the average case system performance it suffices to understand the size of regions of
attraction for each of them. As in the case of Stag Hunt game, we focus on the projection of the
system to the subspace (p1s, p2s) ⊂ [0, 1]2.
We denote by ζ, ψ, the projected flow and vector field respectively.
Lemma 8.2. All but a zero measure of initial conditions in the polytope (PHare):
p2s ≤ −wp1s + w
p2s ≤ − 1
w
p1s + 1
0 ≤ p1s, p2s ≤ 1
converges to the (Hare,Hare) equilibrium. All but a zero measure of initial conditions in the
polytope (PStag):
p2s ≥ −p1s + 2w
w + 1
0 ≤ p1s, p2s ≤ 1
converges to the (Stag, Stag) equilibrium.
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Proof. First, we will prove the claimed property for polytope (PStag). Since the game is symmetric,
the replicator dynamics are similarly symmetric with p2s = p1s axis of symmetry. Therefore it
suffices to prove the property for the polytope P ′Hare = PHare∩{p2s ≤ p1s} = {p2s ≤ p1s}∩{p2s ≤
−wp1s + w} ∩ {0 ≤ p1s ≤ 1} ∩ {0 ≤ p2s ≤ 1} We will argue that this polytope is forward flow
invariant, i.e., if we start from an initial condition x ∈ P ′Hare ψ(t,x) ∈ P ′Hare for all t > 0. On the
p1s, p2s subspace P ′Hare defines a triangle with vertices A = (0, 0), B = (1, 0) and C = (
w
w+1 ,
w
w+1)
(see figure 2). The line segments AB, AC are trivially flow invariant. Hence, in order to argue
that the ABC triangle is forward flow invariant, it suffices to show that everywhere along the
line segment BC the vector field does not point “outwards” of the ABC triangle. Specifically, we
need to show that for every point p on the line segment BC (except the Nash equilibrium C),
|ζ1s(p)|
|ζ2s(p)| ≥ 1w .
|ζ1s(p)|
|ζ2s(p)| =
p1s|p2s − (p1sp2s + w(1− p1s)(1− p2s))|
p2s|p1s − (p1sp2s + w(1− p1s)(1− p2s))| =
p1s(1− p1s)(w − (w + 1)p2s)
p2s(1− p2s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
However, the points of the line passing through B,C satisfy p2s = w(1− p1s).
|ζ1s(p)|
|ζ2s(p)| =
wp1s(1− p1s)(1− (w + 1)(1− p1s))
w(1− p1s)(1− w(1− p1s))(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
=
p1s(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
(1− w + wp1s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
=
p1s
1− w + wp1s ≥
p1s
wp1s
=
1
w
We have established that the ABC triangle is forward flow invariant. Since the w-coordination
game is a potential game, all but a zero measurable set of initial conditions converge to one of the
two pure equilibria. Since ABC is forward invariant, all but a zero measure of initial conditions
converge to (Hare,Hare). A symmetric argument holds for the triangle AB′C with B′ = (0, 1).
The union of ABC and AB′C is equal to the polygon PHare, which implies the first part of the
lemma.
Next, we will prove the claimed property for polytope (PStag). Again, due to symmetry, it
suffices to prove the property for the polytope P ′Stag = PStag∩{p2s ≤ p1s} = {p2s ≤ p1s}∩{p2s ≥
−p1s + 2ww+1} ∩ {0 ≤ p1s ≤ 1} ∩ {0 ≤ p2s ≤ 1} We will argue that this polytope is forward flow
invariant. On the p1s, p2s subspace P ′Stag defines a triangle with vertices D = (1,
w−1
w+1), E = (1, 1)
and C = ( ww+1 ,
w
w+1). The line segments CD, DE are trivially forward flow invariant. Hence, in
order to argue that the CDE triangle is forward flow invariant, it suffices to show that everywhere
along the line segment CD the vector field does not point “outwards” of the CDE triangle (see
figure 2) . Specifically, we need to show that for every point p on the line segment CD (except
the Nash equilibrium C), |ζ1s(p)||ζ2s(p)| ≤ 1.
|ζ1s(p)|
|ζ2s(p)| =
p1s|p2s − (p1sp2s + w(1− p1s)(1− p2s))|
p2s|p1s − (p1sp2s + w(1− p1s)(1− p2s))| =
p1s(1− p1s)(w − (w + 1)p2s)
p2s(1− p2s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
However, the points of the line passing through C,D satisfy p2s = −p1s + 2ww+1 .
|ζ1s(p)|
|ζ2s(p)| =
p1s(1− p1s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
(−p1s + 2ww+1)(−w−1w+1 + p1s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
=
p1s(1− p1s)
(−p1s + 2ww+1)(−w−1w+1 + p1s)
=
p1s(1− p1s)
2(w−1)
w+1 (− ww+1 + p1s) + p1s(1− p1s)
≤ 1
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We have established that the CDE triangle is forward flow invariant. Since the w-coordination
is a potential game, all but a zero measurable set of initial conditions converge to one of the
two pure equilibria. Since CDE is forward invariant, all but a zero measure of initial conditions
converge to (Stag, Stag). A symmetric argument holds for the triangle CD′E with D′ = (w−1w+1 , 1).
The union of CDE and CD′E is equal to the polygon PStag, which implies the second part of
the lemma.
Proof. The measure/size of µ(PHare) = 2|ABC| = ww+1 , and similarly the measure of µ(PStag) =
2|CDE| = 2
(w+1)2
. The average limit performance of the replicator satisfies
∫
g(∆) sw(ψ(x))dµ ≥
2w · µ(PHare) + 2
(
1− µ(PHare)
)
= 2w
2+1
w+1 . Furthermore,
∫
g(∆) sw(ψ(x))dµ ≤ 2w
(
1− µ(PStag)
)
+
2 · µ(PStag) = 2w(1 − 2(w+1)2 ) + 2 · 2(w+1)2 = 2w − 4 w−1(w+1)2 . This implies that w(w+1)
2
w(w+1)2−2w+2 ≤
APoA ≤ w2+w
w2+1
.
8.3 Analysis of N-star graph
Notation. To simplify notation in this section, we rename strategy Stag as strategy A and
strategy Hare as strategy B. Let’s consider a mixed strategy profile as (x1, . . . ,xn,y) where
xi denotes the mixed strategy of “leaf" agent i, and y denotes the mixed strategy of the center
agent. Since it suffices to track for each agent the probability with which they play strategy
A, i.e., Hare, we will sometimes abuse notation and denote the mixed strategy of agent i by
xi ··= xiA, i.e., the probability with which he is playing strategy A as well as denote a mixed
strategy profile by (x1, . . . , xn, y).
“leaf" Here is the high level idea of the analysis: We start by showing that the only fixed
points with region of attraction with positive measure are those in which all agents choose
strategy A or all agents choose strategy B. After that we show that the limit point of any
nontrivial trajectory will be either one of the two mentioned, or a mixed Nash. Therefore we
need to compute the regions of attraction of the two fixed points where all choose A or all
choose B. To do that, we need to compute the boundary of these two regions (namely the
Center-Stable manifold of the fully mixed ones). This happens as follows: Given an initial point
(x1(0), . . . , xn(0), y(0)), we compute the possible fully mixed limit point (x1, . . . , xn, ww+1) (there
can only be one such possible limit point due to point-wise convergence which is furthermore
constrained due to Lemma 8.3 below) that is on the boundary of the two regions. If the initial
condition is on the upper half space w.r.t to the possible fully mixed limit point (x1, . . . , xn, ww+1)
the dynamics converge to the everyone playing A, otherwise to everyone playing B.
8.3.1 Structure of fixed points
If a “leaf" agent i applies a randomized/mixed strategy at a fixed point, it must be the case
that the strategy of the center agent y = ww+1 . Otherwise, the “leaf" agent would strictly prefer
either strategy A or strategy B. Hence the fixed points of the star graph game have the following
structure: If the center agent has a pure strategy, then all agents must be pure. If the center
agent has a mixed strategy, then
∑
i xi =
w
w+1n. In that case, if all the “leaf" agents have pure
strategies then y can have any value in [0, 1], otherwise y = ww+1 .
8.3.2 Invariants
Lemma 8.3. [ln(xi(t)) − ln(1 − xi(t))] − [ln(xj(t)) − ln(1 − xj(t))] is invariant for all i, j
(independent of t).
Proof. ddt [ln(xi(t))− ln(1−xi(t))]− ddt [ln(xj(t))− ln(1−xj(t))] = [y−w(1−y)]− [y−w(1−y)] =
0.
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Next, we will argue that if we start in the interior of ∆, the system can converge to fixed points,
where either all agent play A or B, or to a fully mixed Nash where y = ww+1 and
∑
xi =
w
w+1n.
Lemma 8.4. For all initial conditions in the interior of ∆, either the dynamic converges to
all A’s, i.e, (1,. . . ,1), or to all B’s, i.e., (0,. . . , 0), or to some fully mixed fixed point, i.e,
(x1, . . . , xn,
w
w+1) with 0 < xi < 1 for all i, and
∑
i xi =
w
w+1n.
Proof. We consider the following two cases:
• If xi(t)→ 1 for some i, then ln(xi(t))− ln(1− xi(t))→ +∞. So from Lemma 8.3 for every
j we get that ln(xj(t))− ln(1− xj(t))→ +∞, hence xj(t)→ 1. Due the structure of the
equilibrium set and pointwise convergence, y(t) must converge to 0 or 1. Due the fact that
the fixed point (1, . . . , 1, 0) is repelling we get that the system converges to all A’s. The
same argument is used if xi(t)→ 0 for some i.
• If the dynamic converges to an equilibrium were all “leaf" agents are mixed, then y = ww+1
and
∑
i xi =
w
w+1n because by the analysis of the structure of the fixed points that is the
only possibility.
Let (x1(0), . . . , xn(0), y(0)) be the initial condition, where xi(0), y(0) are the probabilities
agent i, center agent choose A (1−xi(0), 1−y(0) will be the probability to choose B) respectively.
By Lemma 8.4, we know that the corresponding trajectory will converge either to the all A’s
equilibrium or the all B’s equilibrium or a fully mixed one. Next, by using Lemma 8.3 we will
narrow down the possibilities for this fully mixed equilibrium to a single one, which we denote
by (x1, . . . , xn, ww+1).
For each leaf agent i > 1, we define a positive constant ci such that
ci =
xi(0)/(1− xi(0))
x1(0)/(1− x1(0)) .
Due to Lemma 8.3 the quantity xi(t)/(1−xi(t))x1(t)/(1−x1(t)) is time invariant. Hence, the limit point
(x1, . . . , xn,
w
w+1) must satisfy this condition, i.e,
xi =
cix1
1 + (ci − 1)x1 (8)
Moreover, by Lemma 8.4 it must satisfy
∑
xi =
w
w+1n, which combined with (8) implies that:
∑
i
cix1
1 + (ci − 1)x1 =
w
w + 1
n (9)
where we have defined c1 = 1.
Observe that the function f(x) = cx1+(c−1)x is strictly increasing in [0, 1] (given any fixed
positive c) and f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1. Therefore g(x) =
∑
i
cix
1+(ci−1)x − ww+1n is strictly increasing
in [0, 1] (as sum of strictly increasing functions in [0, 1]) and g(0) = − ww+1n < 0 and g(1) =
n − ww+1n > 0. Thus, it has always a unique solution in [0, 1] and equivalently the system of
equations (8,9) has a unique solution. Together with y = ww+1 , the equilibrium limit point lies
in the interior of ∆. Given x1(0), . . . , xn(0) we can compute (approximate with arbitrary small
error ) x1, . . . , xn via binary search (using Bolzano’s theorem).
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Lemma 8.5. Since star graph is a bipartite graph from Lemma 4.8 we have that since (x1, . . . , xn, y)
is a fully mixed Nash then along any system trajectory ((x1(t), . . . , xn(t), y(t))) the function
w
w + 1
ln(y(t)) +
1
w + 1
ln(1− y(t))−
∑
i
[xi ln(xi(t)) + (1− xi) ln(1− xi(t))]
is (time) invariant, i.e. independent of t.
Lemma 8.6. If y(t) ≥ (>) ww+1 and
∑
xi(t) > (≥) ww+1n for some t, the trajectory converges to
all A’s and if y(t) ≤ (<) ww+1 and
∑
xi(t) < (≤) ww+1n for some t, the trajectory converges to all
B’s.
Proof. In the first case, y(t) is increasing and xi(t) (for all i) are non-decreasing and thus
y(t′) > ww+1 and
∑
xi(t
′) > ww+1n holds for all t
′ > t. In the second case y(t) is decreasing
and xi(t) (for all i) are non-increasing and thus y(t′) < ww+1 and
∑
xi(t
′) < ww+1n holds for
all for t′ > t. Combining this with Lemma 8.4, concludes the proof when we consider the
first combination of inequalities. The second combination of inequalities follows in a similar
manner.
Therefore if a trajectory converges to the fully mixed equilibrium (x1, . . . , xn, ww+1) then at
any time t we must have
∑
xi(t) >
w
w+1n and y(t) <
w
w+1 (x1(t), . . . , xn(t) are decreasing and
y(t) increasing) or
∑
xi(t) <
w
w+1n and y(t) >
w
w+1 (x1(t), . . . , xn(t) are increasing and y(t)
decreasing). Combining all the facts together, we get that the stable manifold of the fixed point
(x1, . . . , xn,
w
w+1) can be described as follows: (x1(0), . . . , xn(0), y(0)) lies on the stable manifold
if
∑
i xi(0) > n
w
w+1 and y(0) <
w
w+1 or
∑
i xi(0) < n
w
w+1 and y(0) >
w
w+1 and by Lemma 8.5 we
get that
y(0)
w
w+1 (1− y(0)) 1w+1 = c
∏
i
xi(0)
xi(1− xi(0))1−xi , (10)
where c = (
w
w+1)
w
w+1 ( 1w+1)
1
w+1∏
i(xi)
xi (1−xi)1−xi .
Lemma 8.7. The function xw(1− x) is strictly increasing in [0, ww+1 ] and decreasing in [ ww+1 , 1].
By Lemma 8.7 we have that there exist at most two y(0) that satisfy (10), one which is ≥ ww+1
and one that ≤ ww+1 . If
∑
xi(0) < n
w
w+1 , y(0) should be the largest root of the two so that
dynamics converges to the fully mixed, otherwise the smallest root. If now the initial condition
y(0) does not satisfy (10), then the dynamics converges to all A’s if y(0) is greater that it is
supposed (so that dynamics converges to the fully mixed) and to all B’s otherwise. Therefore we
have the oracle below:
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8.3.3 Oracle Algorithm
Oracle
1. Input: Initial condition (x1(0), . . . , xn(0), y(0))
2. Output: A or B or mixed
3. If
∑
xi(0) > (≥) ww+1n and y(0) ≥ (>) ww+1 return A.
4. If
∑
xi(0) < (≤) ww+1n and y(0) ≤ (<) ww+1 return B.
5. Compute by solving system 8-9 x1, . . . , xn (binary search)
6. Let f(ρ) =
(
ρ(w+1)
w
) w
w+1
[(1− ρ)(w + 1)] 1w+1 −∏i (xi(0)xi )xi (1−xi(0)1−xi )1−xi
7. if (
∑
i xi(0) >
w
w+1n and f(y(0)) < 0) or
(
∑
i xi(0) <
w
w+1n and f(y(0)) > 0) return B.
8. if (
∑
i xi(0) >
w
w+1n and f(y(0)) > 0) or
(
∑
i xi(0) <
w
w+1n and f(y(0)) < 0) return A.
9. return mixed fixed point (x1, . . . , xn, ww+1)
Remark: Given any point from ∆ uniformly at random, under the assumption of solving exactly
the equations to compute x1, . . . , xn to arbitrary high precision the probability that the oracle
above returns mixed is zero.
8.4 Proof of Corollary 5.4
Proof. We first prove the following claim.
Claim 8.8. P
[∑
xi(0) ≤ n ww+1
]
is increasing with n.
Proof. We set by X1, ..., Xn the random starting points xi(0), ..., xn(0). Let Sn :=
∑n
i=1Xi,
x ∈ R, n = 2, 3, . . . , and
Gn(x) := P (Sn/n ≤ x) = 1
n!
∑
j
(−1)j
(
n
j
)
(nx− j)n+,
where u+ := max(0, u); (Irwin–Hall distribution). We may assume that the summation above is
over all integers j, where
(
n
j
)
= 0 if j /∈ {0, . . . , n}. Let
Dn(x) := Gn+1(x)−Gn(x). (11)
It suffices to show that Dn( ww+1) ≥ 0 for w ≥ 1.
First observe that Dn is n− 1 times continuously differentiable, Dn = 0 outside (0, 1), and
also holds that Dn(1− x) = −Dn(x) (by symmetry). For small x > 0 we get Gn(x) = 1n! nnxn >
1
(n+1)! (n+ 1)
n+1xn+1 = Gn+1(x), whence Dn(x) < 0, whence Dn > 0 in a left neighborhood of
1, with Dn(1) = 0 and Dn(1/2) = 0. It suffices to show that Dn has no roots in (1/2, 1) since
1 > ww+1 ≥ 1/2.
Suppose the contrary. By the symmetry, Dn has at least 3 roots in (0, 1). Then, by Rolle
theorem, the derivative G(n−1)n of Gn of order n− 1 has at least 3 + n− 1 = n+ 2 roots in (0, 1).
This contradicts the fact (we prove below) that, for each integer j such that n− 1 ≥ j ≥ n−12 ,
Dn has exactly one root in interval
hn,j := [
j
n ,
j+1
n ).
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Indeed, take any x ∈ [1/2, 1]. It is not hard to see that, for jx := jn,x := bnxc,
G(n−1)n (x) = n
n−1
jx∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
n
j
)
(nx− j)
=
nn−1
n− 1(−1)
jx
(
n
jx + 1
)
(jx + 1)((n− 1)x− jx).
Similarly, for kx := jn+1,x,
G
(n−1)
n+1 (x) =
(n+ 1)n−1
2n(n− 1) (−1)
kx
(
n+ 1
kx + 1
)
(kx + 1)P (n, kx, x),
where
P (n, k, x) := −2k (n2 − 1)x+ k(kn− 1) + n (n2 − 1)x2.
Note that kx ∈ {jx, jx + 1}. We consider the following two cases.
Case 1: kx = jx = j ∈ [n−12 , n− 1], which is equivalent to x ∈ h′n,j := [ jn , j+1n+1). It also follows
that in this case j ≥ n/2. In this case, it is not hard to check that Dn(x) equals (−1)jPn,j,1(x)
in sign, where
Pn,j,1(x) :=2jn
n(n− j) + x (−2(n− 1)nn(n− j)− 2j(n+ 1)n (n2 − 1))+
j(n+ 1)n(jn− 1) + (n+ 1)n (n2 − 1)nx2,
which is convex in x. Moreover, Pn,j,1( jn) and Pn,j,1(
j+1
n+1) each equals 2n
n − (1 + n)n < 0 in sign.
So, Pn,j,1 < 0 and hence Dn has no roots in h′′n,j = [
j
n ,
j+1
n+1).
Case 2: kx = j + 1 and jx = j ∈ [n−12 , n− 1], which is equivalent to x ∈ h′′n,j := [ j+1n+1 , j+1n ). In
this case, it is true that Dn(x) equals (−1)j+1Pn,j,2(x) in sign, where
Pn,j,2(x) :=(j + 1) ((n+ 1)
n(jn+ n− 1)− 2jnn) + 2(j + 1) ((n− 1)nn − (n+ 1)n (n2 − 1))x+
n
(
n2 − 1) (n+ 1)nx2,
and is convex in x. Moreover, Pn,j,1( j+1n ) and −Pn,j,1( j+1n+1) equal 2nn − (1 + n)n < 0 in sign. So,
Pn,j,2 has exactly one root in h′′n,j and hence so does Dn.
Since the interval hn,j is the disjoint union of h′n,j and h
′′
n,j , Dn has exactly one root in
hn,j = [
j
n ,
j+1
n ), and the proof is complete.
There are exactly two possible outcomes with positive probability; all the agents choose
strategy A and all choose strategy B. Assume we take one sample at random (x1, . . . , xn, y)
from ×n+1i=1 ∆2 where n + 1 are the number of agents. Let px, py be the the probability that
a sample at random satisfies
∑
i xi ≤ n ww+1 and y < ww+1 respectively. It turns out from the
oracle above on the star-graph game (see also discussion earlier) that if (
∑
i xi < n
w
w+1 and
y < ww+1) or (
∑
i xi < n
w
w+1 and f(y) > 0) or (
∑
i xi > n
w
w+1 and f(y) < 0) then the dynamics
eventually converges to all agents choose B. Hence the region of attraction of the outcome all
agents choose B will be at least the probability px · py ≥ ww+1 · ww+1 (by Claim 8.8 for n = 1 is
minimum). Since the optimal is w(n+ 1), we get that the average price of anarchy is at most
w(n+1)
( w
w+1
)2w(n+1)+(1−( w
w+1
)2)(n+1)
= w(w+1)
2
w3+2w+1
. The quantity w(w+1)
2
w3+2w+1
is less than 1.42.
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8.5 Proof of Theorem 5.5
In this section, we will prove the following bounds on the average price of anarchy of linear,
symmetric load balancing games. We will break down the proof of theorem 5.5 into several
technical lemmas. The next definition encodes Nash equilibria where randomizing agents do not
“interact” with each other.
Definition 8.9. We call a mixed Nash equilibrium of a load balancing game to be almost pure,
if the intersection of the supports of the strategies of any two randomizing agents contains only
edges whose latency functions are constant functions.
Lemma 8.10. The average price of anarchy of a symmetric, linear load balancing games is at
most equal to the ratio of the cost of the worst almost pure Nash equilibrium divided by the cost
of the optimal outcome.
Proof. By corollary 4.6 we have that for all but a zero measure of initial conditions replicator
dynamics converges to weakly stable equilibria. By definition, weakly stable equilibria have the
property that given any two agents with mixed strategies strategies if one agent deviates to one
the strategies in his support and plays it with probability one then the second agent should
still stay indifferent between the strategies in his support. If there exists two agents with mixed
strategies such that the intersection of their supports contains machines with strictly increasing
latency functions then if one agent deviates to playing that machine with probability one, he
will strictly increase the cost experienced by the second agent on that machine, whereas by this
deviation he can only decrease the cost of all other machines in the support of the second agent.
The second agent is no longer indifferent between the strategies in his support and thus the
initial equilibrium was not weakly stable. In the worst case average price of anarchy places all of
the probability mass of initial conditions to the worst almost pure Nash equilibrium. In this case
the average price of anarchy would be equal to the ratio of the cost of the worst almost pure
Nash equilibrium divided by the cost of the optimal outcome.
Lemma 8.11. In symmetric linear load balancing games all pure Nash equilibria have optimal
makespan.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, suppose that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium whose makespan,
i.e., the load of the most congested machine, is not optimal amongst all outcomes/configurations.
That means that its most loaded machine must be a machine with a strictly increasing cost
function that has higher load than its load at the optimal outcome.15 Hence, there must be
another machine whose load is strictly less than its load at the optimal configuration. If we
move one agent from the first to the second machine we claim that its cost will strictly decrease.
Indeed, its new latency is at most the latency of the second machine in the optimal configuration,
which is less or equal to the optimal makespan, which by hypothesis is strictly less than the
makespan of the first configuration, which was its original cost. Hence, the original configuration
cannot be a Nash equilibrium and we have reached a contradiction.
Lemma 8.12. In any symmetric, linear load balancing games the ratio of the cost of the
worst almost pure Nash equilibrium divided by the cost of the optimal outcome is at most 3/2.
Furthermore, this bound is tight.
Proof. First, we create the lower bound. We have a load balancing game with two agents
and three machines. The latency function for the first machine is 3x whereas for the other
two machines is 2x. It is straightforward to check that the strategy outcome where the first
agent chooses the first machine and the second agent chooses one of the remaining two machines
15If there exist more than one outcomes with minimal makespan, we just arbitrary focus on one of the optimal
configurations.
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uniformly at random is a Nash equilibrium and, in fact, a weakly stable one. The makespan of this
equilibrium is 3, whereas the optimal state has each of the two agents choosing deterministically
one of the last two machines and using it by themselves. The makespan of that outcome is 2,
which results in a lower bound of 3/2.16
Next, we will show that this bound is tight. First, we will establish that it suffices to examine
Nash equilibria where the intersection between the supports of the mixed strategies of any two
randomizing agents is empty. Indeed, suppose that we have two randomizing agents where the
intersection of their supports contains some machines with constant latency functions. If we force
one of the two agents to deviate and choose deterministically the strategy of constant latency in
his support then the makespan of the state remains constant and furthermore the outcome is still
a weakly stable Nash. The reason that it remains a Nash is that if an agent wished to deviate
to some strategy used by the deviating agent originally, then when deviating to that machine
he would experience exactly the same cost as when using the machine with the constant cost
function. Thus, he could have profitably deviated in the initial configuration. This is impossible
since that configuration was a Nash equilibrium. Trivially, this new Nash equilibrium is weakly
stable since we have only decreased the number of randomizing agents and the supports of the
remaining randomizing agents remained the same. We can keep performing these deviations
up until there no longer randomizing agents for which the intersection of the supports contains
any machine (of constant latency function). Hence, in terms of identifying the almost pure
Nash equilibrium with the worst makespan it suffices to focus on the set of almost mixed Nash
equilibria where the intersection of the supports of any two randomizing agents is empty.
We have established that if suffices to focus on mixed Nash equilibria where each machine has
at most one randomizing agent. We will establish that the makespan of each such equilibrium is
within a 3/2 factor of the makespan of a pure Nash equilibrum, which by Lemma 8.11 implies
that it is within a 3/2 factor of the optimal makespan. The argument is as follows: We will start
from the mixed Nash and will proceed by fixing the randomizing agents to playing strategies
in their support with probability one. We start from the randomizing agent i that experiences
minimum cost amongst all randomizing agents. We fix him to playing the strategy in his support
that he chose with minimal probability in the original mixed Nash. We also fix the rest of the
randomizing agents to arbitrary strategies in their support. Next, we repeatedly go through
all agents in decreasing cost order and we allow each agent to move and migrate to the least
expensive (available) machine if it is strictly cheaper than his current machine. Due to symmetry
once we find one agent who does not wish deviate all of the rest of the agents do not wish
to deviate either due to symmetry of the available machines. This process will terminate at
equilibrium since this is a potential game. Furthermore, agent i (nor of any of the other agents
in his machine) will ever move during this process. If he did move then there would exist at some
point a profitable deviating move from him. However, immediately after fixing the randomizing
agents to choosing something in their current support, agent i did not have any improving
deviations since his experienced cost was minimal amongst all randomizing agents and hence at
least as small as the cost of any deviation. In fact, the cheapest available deviations are exactly
the strategies that belonged in his support. As we allow costly agents to move greedily from their
current strategy to the best available strategy the cost of the best available deviation cannot
decrease with time. Thus, agent i will not deviate. Hence, the makespan at the resulting pure
Nash equilibrium will be at least equal the cost of agent i when his was fixed to the strategy
that he played with minimal probability. If we denote that edge as e and its load (excluding
agent i) as xe then this implies that the makespan at the resulting Nash and thus the optimal
makespan is at least ae(xe + 1) + be. However, the original mixed state was an equilibrium and if
agent i played strategy e with probability p then no agent in the original Nash equilibrum would
experience cost more than ae(xe + p+ 1) + be.17 But since e was chosen to be the strategy played
16This construction is due to Bobby Kleinberg.
17If he did we would strictly prefer to deviate to edge e.
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with minimal probability in his original support p ≤ 1/2 and hence no agent can experience
cost more than ae(xe + 3/2) + be. So, the original makespan is at most ae(xe + 3/2) + be and
the optimal makespan is at least ae(xe + 1) + be. The ratio between these two terms becomes
maximal (and equal to 3/2) for be = 0 and xe = 0, which is exactly satisfied by our tight lower
bound.
Remark 8.13. If we slightly perturb the above tight example so that the latency function for the
first machine is 3x whereas for the other two machines is 2x+  then the continuum of equilibria
with the bad makespan will have a non-negligible region of attraction resulting in an average price
of anarchy which is strictly greater than one.
Lemma 8.14. In generic symmetric linear load balancing games the set of almost pure Nash
equilibria coincides with the set of pure Nash equilibria. Specifically, the set of linear latency
functions such the set of almost pure Nash equilibria is a strict superset of the set of pure Nash
equilibria is of measure zero within the set of all linear latency functions.
Proof. We will show that if a linear symmetric load balancing game has an almost pure Nash
equilibrium that is not pure, i.e., that has at least one agent using a randomized strategy, then the
coefficients of the linear latency functions belong to a zero measure set. Indeed, let’s focus on one
of the randomizing agents. Since this agent is indifferent between (at least) two machines/edges
e, e′ and he is the only randomizing agent using these machines (or some of these machines have
a constant latency function) then there exist integer numbers k, k′, so that the cost of these two
machines are equal under loads k, k′. This implies that ae · k+ be = ae′ · k′+ b′e. However, for any
fixed k, k′ the set of coefficients ae, ae′ , be, be′ that satisfy this linear equation is a zero-measure set.
Hence, given any number of agents and machines the set of latency functions that have almost
pure Nash equilibria that are not pure can be expressed as a countable union of zero-measure
sets, which is a zero-measure set.
By combining the lemmas of this section, Theorem 5.5 follows immediately.
8.6 Proof of Theorem 5.6
In the classic game of N identical balls/agents, with N identical bins/machines, each ball chooses
a distribution over the bins selfishly and we assume that the cost of bin γ is equal to γ’s load.
We know for this game that the PoA is Ω( logNlog logN ) [8]. We will prove that the Average PoA is 1.
This is derived via corollary 4.6 and by showing that in this case the set of weakly stable Nash
equilibria coincides with the set of pure equilibria.
Lemma 8.15. In the problem of N identical balls and N identical bins every weakly stable Nash
equilibrium is pure.
Proof. Assume we have a weakly Nash equilibrium p. From corollary 4.6, we have the following
facts:
• Fact 1: For every bin γ, if a agent i chooses γ with probability 1 > piγ > 0, he must be
the only agent that chooses that bin with nonzero probability. Let i, j two agents that
choose bin γ with nonzero probabilities and also piγ , pjγ < 1. Clearly if agent i changes his
strategy and chooses bin γ with probability one, then agent j doesn’t stay indifferent (his
cost ciγ increases).
• Fact 2: If agent i chooses bin γ with probability one, then he is the only agent that chooses
bin γ with nonzero probability. This is true because every ball/agent j 6= i can find a bin
with load less than 1 to choose.
From Facts 1,2 and since the number of balls is equal to the number of bins we get that p must
be pure.
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Proof. Hence from Lemma 8.15 and 4.6 we get that for all but measure zero starting points of
g(∆), the replicator converges to pure Nash equilibria. Every pure Nash equilibrium (each ball
chooses a distinct bin) has social cost (makespan) 1, which is the optimal makespan. Hence the
Average PoA is 1.
Remark: The lemma below shows how crucial is Lindelőf’s lemma (essentially separability
of Rm for all m) in the proof of Theorem 4.5. Even simple and well studied instances of games
with constant number of agents and strategies may have uncountably many equilibria. In such
games, naive union bound arguments do not suffice since we cannot argue about the measure of
an uncountable union of measure zero sets.
Lemma 8.16. Let n ≥ 4 then the set of Nash equilibria of the N balls N bins game is
uncountable.
Proof. We will prove it for N = 4 and then the generalization is easy, i.e., if N > 4 then the first
4 agents will play as shown below in the first 4 bins and each of the remaining N − 4 agent will
choose a distinct remaining bin. Below we give matrix A where Aiγ = piγ . Observe that for any
x ∈ [14 , 34 ] we have a Nash equilibrium.
A =

x 1− x 0 0
1/2 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0 1/2
0 0 x 1− x
 .
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